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Kirk Julliard Gosch appeals from his judgment of conviction for manufacturing a 
controlled substance (marijuana), possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to deliver (marijuana), and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces. 
Mr. Gosch was convicted following a jury trial, and the district court imposed unified 
sentences of five years, with two years fixed, and placed Mr. Gosch on probation. 
Mr. Gosch now appeals, and he asserts that the district court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress. This Reply Brief addresses the State's assertions that the vehicle 
was part of the premises, that the automobile exception applies, that inevitable 
discovery applies, and that the error is harmless. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Gosch's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 




Mr. Gosch asserts that the automobile exception does not apply in this case. 
Therefore, he asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. 
This Reply Brief addresses the State's assertions that the vehicle was part of the 
premises, that the automobile exception applies, that inevitable discovery applies, and 
that the error is harmless. 
B. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Gosch's Motion To Suppress 
1. Premises 
Relying on United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459 (101h Cir. 1990), the State 
asserts that the Suzuki should be considered part of the premises. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.5-8.) The State is incorrect for several reasons. First, there is a large difference 
between the warrant issued in the present case and the warrant issued in Gottschalk. 
As the State notes, in Gottschalk, the "warrant did not specifically list any vehicles to be 
searched, but rather authorized the search of the entire premises for 
methamphetamine." Gottschalk, 915 F.2d at 1460. The warrant in this case, however, 
specifically defined the premises to be searched: "11974 North Rimrock Road, further 
described as a family dwelling, or apartment located above a garage being located 
directly west of 11970 N. Rimrock Road, having an entry on the southside of the 
structure which is the only entrance to the apartment." (R., p.33.) Thus, the "premises" 
is specifically defined as the dwelling or apartment located above a garage. 
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This distinction is imporiant. Citing to Gottschalk and cases it, the district 
in United States v. Barth, F. Supp. 1021 (0. N. D. held that 
language of the warrant was significant: 
The search warrants at issue in this case bear a subtle yet distinctive 
difference from those at issue in the cases cited above. By definition, a 
search of the "premises" is more expansive than a mere search of a 
building in that it would encompass the building and its grounds. However, 
the search warrants issued by Judge Romanick only allowed for a search 
of specific buildings. The warrants did not expressly authorize a search of 
the buildings and the grounds or premises. It is clear that Barth's 
challenge to the search of the Chevy pickup would fail if the search 
warrants had contained a specific reference to the "premises." However, 
the undisputed fact remains that the search warrants incorporated no such 
language. 
/d. at 1027. In this case, the magistrate specifically defined the "premises" as the 
dwelling, not the entire premises, including vehicles. 
Second, after identifying the dwelling to be searched, the magistrate authorized 
the search of a black Jeep in the warrant. (R., p.33.) By specifically listing this vehicle 
to be searched in addition to the residence, it is clear that the magistrate was 
authorizing only a search of the dwelling and this particular vehicle; if the magistrate 
intended the search warrant to cover any vehicle on the premises, listing the Jeep as 
another item to be searched would be unnecessary. "In statutory interpretation, the 
maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' meaning that the specific mention of 
certain things implies the exclusion of all others, is a recognized rule." State v. Acuna, 
154 Idaho 139, 142, 294 P.3d 1151, 1154 (Ct. App. 2013). While it is generally a 
maxim in statutory construction, there is no reason the principle should not be applied to 
the language of warrants. The Suzuki was not part of the "premises" in this case and 
therefore the order denying the motion to suppress cannot be affirmed on this basis. 
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2. Automobile Exception 
Mr. Gosch asserts that none of the rationales supporting the automobile 
exception apply in this case. The State asserts that the automobile exception applies 
regardless of whether it proved either that the vehicle was mobile or that the vehicle 
was not in a place "regularly used for residential purposes." (Respondent's Brief, pp.1 0-
12.) Mr. Gosch continues to assert that the State is incorrect because the exception 
does not apply when its underlying justifications are not present. 
With regard to the mobility argument, Mr. Gosch will rest on the opening brief. 
With regard to the vehicle's placement on private property, the State cites United 
States v. Ludwig, 1 0 F .3d 1523 (1oth Cir. 1993 ), for the proposition that the only 
question is whether the "vehicle is so situated at that objective observer would conclude 
that it was being used not as a residence, but a vehicle." (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-
12.) Other courts disagree. Based on California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), the 
Georgia Supreme Court has concluded that the automobile exception did not apply 
where the suspect's vehicle was legally parked in a residential parking space, and the 
suspect did not have access to it. State v. LeJeune, 576 S.E. 2d. 888 (Ga. 2003). The 
court thus concluded that, because the underlying justifications for the exception did not 
apply, the exception did not apply. /d. This Court should hold the same. 
Moreover, a holding that the police could conduct a warrantless search in the 
driveway would run afoul of the recent opinion in Florida v. Jardines, _ U.S._, 133 
S.Ct. 1409 (2013). In Jardines, a police officer, a drug dog, and the dog's handler 
walked up to the front porch of Jardine's house without a warrant. /d. at 1413. While on 
the porch, the dog alerted for the presence of illegal drugs. /d. Based upon the alert, 
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the officers applied for and obtained a warrant to the house. !d. Jardines 
moved to suppress, asserting his Fourth Amendment rights were violated the 
officers' actions. /d. The Florida Supreme Court agreed, and the United States 
Supreme Court affirmed. /d. 
The United States Supreme Court determined that the officers were on the 
curtilage of the residence and then looked to the purpose of their visit: 
"A license may be implied from the habits of the country," notwithstanding 
the "strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close." 
McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136, 43 S.Ct. 16, 67 L.Ed. 167 (1922) 
(Holmes, J.). We have accordingly recognized that "the knocker on the 
front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, 
justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all 
kinds." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 
1233 (1951 ). This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach 
the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, 
and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the 
terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal 
knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation's Girl 
Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed with a 
warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is "no 
more than any private citizen might do." Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.--, 
--, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). 
/d. at 1415-16 (footnote omitted). The Court then determined that the intent of the 
officer was relevant to determine the scope of the license, and that the intent to search 
was not within that license: 
Here, however, the question before the court is precisely whether the 
officer's conduct was an objectively reasonable search. As we have 
described, that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license 
to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they 
entered. Here, their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a 
search, which is not what anyone would think he had license to do. 
/d. 1416-17. Just as in Jardines, there would be no implied license for a person to 
enter a driveway with the intent to conduct a search of a vehicle. Mr. Gosch 
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""''''"'/"''"' that his case is different than Jardines in that officers did have a 
warrant and thus could search the premises as described in 'Narrant, but the 
ramifications of a broad holding that a car on private property can be searched would 
run afoul of Jardines. 
3. Inevitable Discovery 
The States asserts that, "after seeing the items moved from Gosch's home to the 
Suzuki and obtaining a positive alert on the Suzuki, the police undoubtedly would have 
been able to obtain a separate search warrant for the Suzuki." (Respondent's Brief, 
14.) Thus, the State asserts that the inevitable discovery should apply. However, the 
doctrine of inevitable discovery "is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole 
by substituting what the police should have done for what they really did." State v. 
Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 226 (Ct. App. 1984 ). "It has been narrowly enunciated and 
applied by the United States Supreme Court." /d. The State's argument is, essentially, 
that since the police may have been able to obtain a warrant, inevitable discovery 
should apply. This is exactly "substituting what the police should have done for what 
they really did." As such, inevitable discovery does not prevent exclusion of the 
evidence. 
4. Harmlessness 
Finally, the State asserts that any error is harmless with regard to the 
manufacturing marijuana charge because that charge was based on compounding or 
converting or processing marijuana into honey oil and honey oil, along with other items 
relating to the manufacture of marijuana were found in the home. (Respondent's Brief, 
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~1 ) However, the jury could have tied the marijuana found in the ki to 
and determined that this marijuana was in the manufacturing. It was 
Mr. Gosch's defense at trial was that it was other individuals that lived at the residence, 
and not him, that manufactured marijuana. Because the evidence of the drugs found in 
the vehicle could tie him to manufacturing, it cannot be said that the error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gosch respectfully requests that the district court's order denying his motion 
to suppress be reversed, that his convictions be vacated, and that this case be 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 81h day of September, 2014. 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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